GREECE’S REJECTION OF YAYLALI’S ASYLUM APPLICATION IS ILLEGAL

The case of Yannis Vasilis Yaylalı concerns a Turkish citizen of Pontic descent who has resided in Greece since 2019 and who has been publicly identified as a political dissident and activist critical of Turkish state conduct. Reporting indicates that he has previously been imprisoned in Turkey and faces continuing criminal exposure connected to his political speech and advocacy. His application for international protection has been rejected at first instance. The legality of that refusal must be examined within the integrated framework of refugee law, European human rights law and European Union law.

Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons including political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and unable or unwilling to avail himself of its protection. Political dissidence lies at the centre of that definition. Where an applicant presents evidence of prior detention, ongoing prosecution, or arrest exposure connected to political expression, the determining authority must conduct an individualised and forward-looking assessment of risk.

The European Court of Human Rights in F.G. v Sweden (Grand Chamber, 2016) held that national authorities are required to carry out a rigorous examination of foreseeable risk on return, including risks arising from political activity and expression known to the authorities of the receiving state. The analysis must engage directly with the applicant’s personal profile and current country conditions. Generalised references to stability or diplomatic relations cannot substitute for a structured evaluation of individual exposure.

Refugee protection under Article 1A(2) extends to persecution “for reasons of political opinion.” The interpretive focus of that phrase rests on the motive of the persecutor rather than the subjective ideology of the applicant. Authoritative interpretation has long recognised that protection arises where a political opinion is attributed to the individual by the authorities. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, at paragraphs 80 to 84, explains that an applicant may qualify where such an opinion has been imputed to him. European Union law reflects the same approach. Article 10(1)(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU requires assessment of whether the applicant holds a political opinion or whether it is attributed to him by the actor of persecution. The emphasis lies on the perception of the state and the consequences that flow from that perception.

In Yaylalı’s case, if Turkish authorities regard his activism, public criticism or advocacy as politically hostile, and if that perception has resulted in detention or prosecution, the refugee definition is engaged. The relevant inquiry is whether adverse measures are connected to that attributed political position. A determination that overlooks imputed political opinion fails to apply Article 1A(2) in accordance with its settled interpretation.

A further dimension concerns the distinction between prosecution and persecution. Refugee law recognises that states may enforce general criminal law. It equally recognises that criminal law may be deployed as a mechanism of political repression. The inquiry therefore addresses motive, selectivity and proportionality. If proceedings arise from political speech and carry penalties that are disproportionate or discriminatory, they may constitute persecution. A decision that treats politically sensitive prosecution as neutral without analysing its context does not satisfy the Convention framework.

Country-of-origin information and pattern evidence are legally material. The treatment of comparable dissidents, the use of broadly framed security legislation, detention conditions and the independence of the judiciary form part of the required assessment. Strasbourg jurisprudence requires that such information be current, reliable and meaningfully engaged in the reasoning. Omission of this contextual analysis undermines the legality of the determination.

The evidentiary threshold in asylum law is a real risk or reasonable degree of likelihood. It does not require certainty. Where credible past persecution is established, international practice recognises that the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate a fundamental and durable change in circumstances sufficient to neutralise future risk. If prior imprisonment for political reasons forms part of the record, the authority must address whether conditions in the country of origin have changed in a manner that removes that risk. A refusal that applies a higher evidentiary threshold or fails to confront that burden-shifting dynamic misapplies the governing standard.

Non-refoulement provides the ultimate constraint. Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention prohibits return to territories where life or freedom would be threatened for a Convention reason. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits removal where there exists a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. In Soering v United Kingdom (1989), the Court confirmed that responsibility arises through the act of removal itself. In Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) and Saadi v Italy (2008), it affirmed the absolute character of that protection. Article 19(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights restates the same prohibition within Union law.

Article 18 of the EU Charter guarantees the right to asylum with due respect for the Refugee Convention. That provision imposes a positive obligation on Member States to interpret and apply national asylum law in conformity with Convention standards. The Court of Justice of the European Union has further articulated the duty of careful and impartial examination of all relevant elements of an application. Directive 2013/32/EU requires an effective remedy providing full and ex nunc examination of fact and law. Where an arguable Article 3 claim is raised, Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires a remedy that is rigorous, independent and suspensive in effect.

Freedom of expression jurisprudence also needs to be considered. Where prosecution arises from political speech, proportionality considerations derived from Article 10 ECHR intersect with the persecution inquiry. Disproportionate sanction for expressive political activity may constitute both a violation of freedom of expression and persecution for Convention purposes. In addition, where credible evidence suggests compromised judicial independence or politically influenced proceedings, the risk of flagrant denial of justice under Article 6 ECHR becomes legally relevant.

The cumulative effect of these doctrines produces a coherent legal structure. If Yaylalı’s prior detention and current prosecutorial exposure arise from political dissent; if country evidence demonstrates adverse treatment of comparable critics; if no fundamental change in circumstances has been established; and if the risk assessment failed to apply the correct evidentiary threshold or engage with imputed political opinion, the refusal of protection conflicts with Article 1A(2) and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, Article 3 and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 18 and 19(2) of the EU Charter, and the procedural guarantees of EU asylum law.

Where binding norms require disciplined, structured and evidence-based reasoning, and where the resulting decision diverges from those norms in a case involving a documented political dissident, the inference that emerges is difficult to avoid. The reasoning appears shaped less by the imperatives of legal doctrine and more by considerations external to it. On the available facts, the refusal bears the characteristics of a political determination rather than the product of strict legal analysis.

DEAN KALIMNIOU

kalymnios@hotmail.com

First published in NKEE on Saturday 21 February 2026